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Abstract:
The protection motivation theory (PMT) is widely used in behavioral information security research, with multiple
instantiations of the theoretical model applied in the literature. The purpose of this study is to perform a theoretical
(conceptual) replication of both the core and full (PMT) nomologies in the context of voluntary password manager
application use for individual home end-users. In our study, the full PMT model explained more variance than the core
PMT model, but the relationships between multiple behavioral antecedents differed between the core and full PMT
models, possibly due to differences in model complexity. Our findings suggest that researchers should justify the version
of the PMT that they choose to use based on their research objectives with the understanding that the same variables
may be significant in one version of the PMT but not significant in another version of the PMT.
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Evaluating the Core and Full Protection Motivation Theory Nomologies

Introduction

There are numerous theoretical models used in the behavioral information security literature, but one of the
most common is protection motivation theory (PMT) (Aurigemma, 2013). The PMT focuses on the cognitive
processes by which individuals assess a threat and how they feel they can cope with that threat as leading
indicators of their intent to perform a behavior (Rogers, 1975, 1983). The appraisal of the threat and coping
responses results in the intention to perform (or not perform) a particular information security action
(Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). The PMT is attractive to information security researchers because it
focuses on both a threat and a prevailing countermeasure to mitigate that threat (Crossler & Belanger, 2014;
Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). Given the logical fit between security related behaviors and the
PMT, information security researchers have suggested that the PMT has wide generalizability across many
different types of behavioral information security issues (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015;
Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2015, Warkentin, Johnston, Walden, & Straub, 2016). However, the level of
generalizability associated with the PMT constructs remains an open theoretical and empirical question
partially due to the many different variations of the PMT that have been used in the prior literature.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a replication of the core PMT models as used by Warkentin,
Johnston, Shropshire, and Barnett (2016) and Siponen, Mahmood, and Pahnila (2014) along with the full
PMT nomology as used by Boss et al. (2015) and Posey et al. (2015). This paper replicates these two
different instantiations of the PMT using the voluntary adoption of password manager applications (i.e.,
applications used to manage a user’s passwords across multiple websites and devices) for home end-users.
Password managers and home end-users are interesting contexts to replicate the PMT because the
adoption of password managers is completely voluntary for home end-users with minimal organizational
variables to potentially confound the results. In our study, the full PMT model explained more variance than
the core PMT model, but the relationships between multiple behavioral antecedents differed between the
core and full PMT models due to differences in model complexity. Our findings suggest that researchers
must justify theoretically the version of the PMT that they choose to use based on their research objective
because the same variables (i.e., self-efficacy and response efficacy) may be significant in one version of
the PMT but not significant in another version of the PMT.

2

Protection Motivation Theory

The PMT relies upon the use of fear appeals to engender threats in order to motivate protective security
behaviors. Fear appeals are “a persuasive communication that attempts to arouse fear in order to promote
a precautionary motivation and self-protective action” (Ruiter, Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 2014, p. 65). The
PMT suggests that fear appeals motivate two cognitive processes: 1) threat appraisal and 2) coping
responses. The threat appraisal is an assessment of the threat severity and personal susceptibility to that
threat, whereas coping responses are assessments of the effectiveness of the potential responses and
one’s ability to undertake the responses. Both of these cognitive processes results in high or low protection
motivations to perform (or not perform) a particular information security action (Boss et al., 2015; Workman
et al., 2008).
It is important to note that a fear appeal is more than just a threatening message; Witte, Meyer, and Martell
(2001) argue that successful1 fear appeals must include both a threat appraisal and a coping response.
Having the threat appraisal without the coping response in a fear appeal message typically results in an
unsuccessful fear appeal (Boss et al., 2015; Witte et al., 2001). A successful threat appraisal articulates
the magnitude of the threat along with the real possibility that the danger associated with the threat can
occur to the participant (on a personal level). A successful coping response communicates how the
prescriptive solution works, demonstrates that it is within the capability of the recipient of the message, and
addresses common barriers from performing the designated response. Prior research has demonstrated
that fear appeals containing these two components can activate protection motivation even with small levels
of fear in the fear appeal message (Gore et al., 2015; Ruiter et al., 2014). However, high scare tactics
without coupling those scare tactics with proper coping responses may not motivate protective actions (Gore
et al., 2015; Witte et al., 2001).

1

Per Ruiter et al. (2014), fear appeal messages are more appropriately classified as successful or unsuccessful rather than high versus
low fear appeal messages as tested by Boss et al. (2015). Gore and Bracken (2005) show that only a marginal amount of threat is
necessary in a fear appeal to motivate protective actions.
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In the “core” PMT, coping responses consist of an individual’s self-efficacy (belief in one’s ability) to perform
a security action, the perceived response efficacy (perceived effectiveness) of the required action, whereas
threat appraisals capture the perception of one’s vulnerability (perceived likelihood that the threat will occur)
from the related security threat and the perceived severity (perceived impact of the threat) of the security
threat being studied (Siponen et al., 2014; Warkentin et al., 2016). Figure 1 displays the core PMT model.
In general (with a few reported exceptions), higher self-efficacy, higher response efficacy, greater perceived
vulnerabilities, and greater perceived severities have been shown to lead to increased protection
motivations regarding a wide variety of behavioral information security issues (Crossler, Long, Loraas, &
Trinkle, 2014; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015;
Putri & Hovav, 2014; Wall, Palvia, & Lowry, 2013; Warkentin et al., 2016; Workman et al., 2008).
While there is wide agreement in the related literature regarding the behavioral elements identified in the
core PMT, researchers are not in agreement about the wide variety of theoretical extensions to the PMT
that have been proposed in the prior literature. For example, Chen and Zahedi (2016) used the core PMT
constructs in Figure 1 but added a higher-order construct (perceived threat) to capture threat appraisals,
which are influenced by both perceived threat susceptibility and severity. Doing so, however, creates a
formative versus reflective construct definition issue along with measurement issues that are still open for
debate. Additionally, both Johnston and Warkentin (2010) and Johnston et al. (2015) utilize the core PMT
constructs albeit with different theorized relationships. Johnston and Warkentin (2010) propose a PMT
model where the threat appraisal constructs are antecedents to the coping constructs. The Johnston et al.
(2015) PMT model builds off the Johnston and Warkentin (2010) model by adding both a direct effect of the
threat appraisal constructs on protection motivations as well as an indirect effect through coping appraisals.
Both of their models propose interesting instantiations of the PMT but are also significant deviations from
the PMT’s historical roots. Despite these variations, the core PMT model identified in Figure 1 presents the
simplest interpretation, which has been widely used in recent behavioral information security studies such
as Warkentin et al. (2016) and Siponen et al. (2014). Therefore, this paper replicates the core model of the
PMT that is displayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Core PMT Model

Recently, both Posey et al. (2015) and Boss et al. (2015) have proposed the use of a “full” PMT nomology
to explain behavioral information security problems. Figure 2 displays the full PMT nomology. Both Posey
et al. (2015) and Boss et al. (2015) present the full PMT nomology as a full conceptual implementation of
the theory based upon their interpretation of the theoretical roots of the PMT (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn,
1997). Their full PMT nomology includes the following three factors: 1) response cost (the perceived cost
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in terms of money, time, and cognitive resources) as an important addition to coping appraisal 2 , 2)
maladaptive rewards (any kind of reward for not partaking in the prescribed protective action) as an
additional component of one’s threat appraisal mechanism and 3) perceived fear resulting from a specific
fear-appeal impetus. Maladaptive rewards addresses the impact of perceived benefits (implicit or explicit)
of continuing risky behaviors (Floyd et al., 2000). Adding maladaptive rewards to the PMT allows a
conditional proposition that would otherwise not be considered – if no threat is perceived or the reward for
not taking the protective action is greater than the perceived threat, the person subject to the fear appeal
may not activate their coping appraisal mechanisms and protection motivation (Boss et al., 2015).
Fear, while an inherent component of every PMT-related study that utilizes a fear appeal, has not
traditionally been measured as a separate construct that directly (or indirectly) impacts protection motivation
or influences other behavioral antecedents (Boss et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015). In their full PMT
nomology, Boss et al. (2015) and Posey et al. (2015) argue that perceived fear from an information security
threat not only directly impacts protection motivation but also partially mediates the effects of perceived
threat severity and vulnerability. Measuring fear in this manner not only provides a direct measurement of
the effectiveness of the fear appeal message used for the information security threat of interest but it also
allows the examination of the impact of that fear on both threat perceptions and protection motivation (Boss
et al., 2015).

Figure 2. Full PMT Model

The full PMT nomology is a more articulated representation of the theoretical roots of the PMT, which
contributes a deeper understanding of the behavioral antecedents affecting protection motivations. In doing
so, however, the full PMT becomes a less parsimonious behavioral model, which leads to potential data
collection issues (more and varied data need to be collected) as well as complicates future exploration of
other behavioral factors that, in conjunction with PMT variables, improve understanding of protection
motivation. Therefore, it is important to compare the core PMT model with the full PMT model to determine
if the cost of being less parsimonious has more explanatory power in the context of the specific behavioral
information security problem being investigated.

2

Boss et al. (2015) include response costs in their declaration of the core PMT nomology. However, we agree with Posey et al. (2015)
that response costs are less prevalent in the behavioral information security PMT literature and, thus, we include the response cost
construct in the full nomology only.
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Research Design and Methods

To empirically test the core and full PMT nomologies in the context of password managers, we employed a
sequential two-part study of the adoption (or non-adoption) of a password manager application. 3 Part 1
consisted of presenting a poor password management fear appeal message immediately followed by a
survey to capture self-reported perceptions of the factors that affect home end-user security behavior
intentions. Part 2, which occurred one week after the completion of Part 1 of the study, captured actual
security behavior of the participant. This process is consistent with Boss et al. (2015) and Warkentin et al.
(2016) who captured both actual security behaviors and behavioral intentions.

3.1

Participants

We sampled undergraduate college students from a private university in the Midwest portion of the United
States. While academics often criticize the use of college students as the sample population in research,
much of that criticism comes from trying to generalize the results of student derived data to other
organizational contexts (Peterson, 2001). When investigating home end-user information security practices,
college students are an excellent population to study due to their extensive use of technology, familiarity
with online applications, and lack of conscientiousness with their information privacy and security practices
(Drennan, Sullivan, & Previte, 2006).

3.2

Constructs and Measures

We adapted pre-validated (reflective) scales from previous behavioral information security research (as
documented in Boss et al. (2015)) to measure all of our latent constructs. We measured all items reflectively
using 7-point Likert scales ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. Appendix A provides
the items, means, standard deviations, and factor loadings. As mentioned earlier, the fear appeal is an
essential part of any PMT study. In this study, we built our fear appeal based on the guidelines presented
by Witte et al. (2001) and Ruiter et al. (2014). We formatted the fear appeal in a video (see Appendix B for
the video link and the transcript). We developed the contents and video format of the message through a
series of three pilot studies conducted with 16 Management Information Systems (MIS) students in an
introductory information security course. After each pilot, we made small modifications to the video in order
to ensure that the video was eliciting a successful fear appeal. The participants in the pilot studies included
a mix of 50% American and 50% International students of which only three had prior working knowledge of
password managers.

3.3

Primary Data Collection

A total of 372 undergraduate students were provided the opportunity to participate in this study in return for
a small amount of extra credit in their course (between 1 and 2% depending on the instructor). The first
part of the study provided the participants with a link to an online video that included a fear appeal message
related to poor password management and an online survey to measure all of the behavioral constructs
including their intent to install and use a password manager within the following week. The second part of
the study was conducted one week later to ascertain whether the participants followed through with the
security behavior. In part two of the study, we asked the participants whether they took the action to
download and use the recommended password manager application or some other password manager. If
participants indicated that they adopted a password manager, we asked several questions that could be
answered only by using the “Security Challenge” tool in the password manager, which included the relative
strength of their master password, total security score for all their accounts, and total number of accounts
in their password manager application after initial use.
Individual survey participation was voluntary and responses were de-identified prior to data analysis. We
collected a total of 286 responses for the first part of the study, which represents a 77% response rate.
Three participants dropped out before part 2, which left us with 283 usable data points. We used covariancebased structural equation modeling (CBSEM) with version 23 of AMOS to evaluate construct relationships
and model fit. CBSEM is an appropriate analysis method when testing proposed relationships between
latent constructs of a theoretically derived, a priori model (Lowry & Gaskin, 2014; Raykov, 2006), which is
3

Boss et al. (2015) compared a high and a low fear appeal message in their study. We are not attempting to compare different fear
appeals in this theoretical replication. Instead, we are testing the core and full PMT nomology given a specific fear appeal that did
quantifiably generate a level of fear coupled with a coping response.
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the case for our study. Prior to conducting CBSEM analyses, we successfully screened the data for issues
that may jeopardize the results, such as outliers, multicollinearity, non-normality, and missing data (Byrne,
2001; Kline, 2011).

3.4

Instrument Validity and Structural Path Analysis

CBSEM consists of two parts: (1) a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) stage and (2) the structural model
analysis (also known as path analysis) stage (Heck, 1998). The CFA stage assesses the quality and validity
of the construct measures and is performed on the entire set of measurement items for all latent constructs
simultaneously with each observed variable restricted to load on its a priori factor. We examined the
average variance extracted (AVE) to ensure individual item reliability and convergent validity. Table 1
displays the measurement item loadings on their respective constructs in the factor loading column. All
factor loadings were in the range of 0.666 – 0.991. While the recommended threshold for item loadings is
0.7, individual item loadings between .40 and .70 are acceptable for inclusion as long as composite
reliabilities are above .70 (which they were for all constructs) (Chin, 1998). The AVE values were greater
than the minimum recommended value of 0.50 in our data, which indicates that the items satisfied the
convergent validity requirements.
Table 1. Confirmatory factor analysis results
Construct

CR

AVE

MSV

ASV

Fear

PMI

TSEV

PVUL

REFF

SEFF

Fear

.848

.650

.236

.109

.806

PMI

.966

.904

.187

.113

.374

.951

TSEV

.840

.639

.236

.115

.486

.271

.800

PVUL

.793

.563

.195

.087

.442

.139

.359

.751

REFF

.868

.688

.355

.146

.285

.361

.457

.440

.830

SEFF

.860

.672

.355

.170

.325

.427

.361

.263

.596

.820

COST

.820

.604

.436

.125

-.057

-.432

-.127

.066

-.161

-.451

COST

MAL

.777

MAL
.908 .715
.436
.097
-.005 -.237
-.099
-.012
-.170
-.383 .660
.845
Legend: CR = Composite Reliability, AVE = Average Variance Explained, MSV = Maximum Shared Squared
Variance, ASV = Average Shared Squared Variance, PMI = Protection Motivation Intention, TSEV = Perceived
Threat Severity, PVUL = Perceived Threat Vulnerability, MAL = Maladaptive Rewards, REFF = Response Efficacy,
SEFF = Self Efficacy, COST = Response Costs

Due to the nature of our data collection instrument, common method variance attributed to measurement
method instead of the constructs of interest may bias our results (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff,
2003). We took several steps to mitigate and assess the potential of common method bias per the guidance
in Gefen et al. (2011) and Podsakoff et al. (2003). First, we used the security challenge to objectively
determine actual use, which mitigates this problem for actual usage but not for behavioral intentions.
Second, we used survey best practices to minimize the possible impact of common method bias (Dillman,
Smyth, & Christian, 2014). For instance, study participation was completely voluntary, respondents were
assured anonymity prior to data analysis (i.e., we removed email address identifiers to match participants
with both parts of the study after data aggregation and prior to analyzing any data), and the survey
instructions stated that there were no right or wrong answers so respondents could answer honestly. Third,
we conducted the unmeasured latent methods construct (ULMC) approach in accordance with Richardson,
Simmering, and Sturman (2009). This method compares the standardized loadings of the items on their
respective constructs between CFAs with and without the ULMC marker construct. For our sample, the
average difference across all items’ standardized loadings was less than 0.01 with a maximum difference
of 0.070. Additionally, none of the measured construct items loaded significantly on the marker construct.
While the results of the ULMC analysis and the above mitigations do not completely negate the possibility
of common method variance, it does suggest that it is not a major concern in our data.
To ensure the discriminant validity of the latent constructs in the research model, we examined the AVE,
maximum shared squared variance (MSV), and average shared squared variance (ASV). Table 1 displays
all of these values. In our data, the MSV and ASV were both less than the AVE, which is evidence of
discriminant validity because the construct items load more on their respective latent variables than on other
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constructs (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Based upon the criteria set forth in Jarvis et al. (2003)
and Petter et al. (2007), all of the construct measures met the requirements to be considered reflective
indicators of their respective latent constructs. Finally, the model fit for the CFA analysis (which includes all
latent constructs) was satisfactory (χ2 = 419.32, df = 247, χ2/df = 1.698; CFI = 0.963; SRMR = .0424).
Following establishment of the measurement model in the CFA stage, we fit the data to the a priori research
models as shown in Figures 1 and 2. We assessed initial model fit using multiple criteria such as chi-square,
degrees of freedom, and normed chi-square (χ2/df) (Heck, 1998; Kline, 2011; Raykov, 2006). To further
account for the potential impact of even mild deviations from perfectly normal data distributions on the χ2
calculations, we conducted Bollen-Stine (1992) bootstrapping to calculate model fit p-values, which were all
above the common 0.05 threshold. However, reliance upon χ2 measurements alone for model fit
determination is cautioned. As such, we used one goodness-of-fit and one badness-of-fit metric to further
assess overall model fit (Heck, 1998).
We used the comparative fit index (CFI) as our goodness-of-fit metric. The CFI measures model fit relative
to a null model and non-centrality index. In our data, the CFI values for the core and full PMT CBSEM
model evaluation were above the 0.90 (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004) or the 0.95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999)
recommended thresholds. We used the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), which compares
the residuals (unexplained variance) to what would be reasonably expected from a well-fitting model, as our
badness-of-fit metric. In all of our models, the SRMR were below the common threshold of 0.08, which
indicates good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).

4
4.1

Results
Part 1: Modelling Protection Motivation

Table 2 displays the results of the CBSEM structural path analyses for the first part of this study. Model fit
was satisfactory for both the core PMT (χ2 / df = 1.552, CFI = 0.984, AIC = 204.156, and SRMR = .0374)
and the full PMT (χ2 / df = 1.649, CFI = 0.960, AIC = 561.831, and SRMR = .0442) models. Based on
model fit statistics alone, the core PMT model was superior to the full PMT model with a higher CFI and a
lower χ2 / df, AIC, and SRMR. However, the core PMT model (SMC = 0.208) explained almost 15.1% less
variance in protection motivation intentions than the full PMT model (SMC = 0.359). The increased variance
explained by the full PMT model was partially due to the fact that the full PMT model has three additional
variables contributing to protection motivation; two of which (fear and response efficacy) are highly
significant contributors that were not contained in the core PMT model. However, since the fit statistics
were still satisfactory, the full PMT model’s increased variance explained and fuller antecedent explanatory
value indicate a better overall model in our data. Figures 3 and 4 graphically display the results of structural
path analyses.

Figure 1. Core PMT Model Results
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Based on the construct descriptive statistics (see Appendix A) and SEM path analysis (see Table 2), we
see a few notable differences between our core and full PMT models. Our respondents reported a strong
belief in the ability of a password manager to counter the poor password management threat (response
efficacy mean = 5.75, standard deviation = 0.916). Yet, in our core PMT model response efficacy was a
relatively weak contributor to protection motivation (β = 0.147, p = 0.095) while it was a stronger and more
significant contributor (β = 0.147, p < 0.05) in our full PMT model. Additionally, while self-efficacy was the
strongest antecedent of protection motivation intentions in our core model (β = 0.312, p < 0.001), it fell out
of significance with the addition of fear and response cost, which are two behavioral antecedents with
defined negative connotations. The threat appraisal constructs in our core and full PMT models were not
directly significant contributors to protection motivation intentions. As shown in Table 2 and Figures 3 & 4,
coping appraisals contributed most strongly to our core PMT model’s relatively low explanatory power
(20.8% of the variance of protection motivation intention) compared to our full PMT model.

Figure 4. Full PMT Model Results

Interestingly, our full PMT model results do not match the Boss et al. (2015) high fear appeal conditions,
their low fear appeal conditions, or the Posey et al. (2015) full model. Our fear path results most closely
match the Boss et al. (2015) high conditions in both of their studies, but our main effects do not match either
the high or the low fear appeal conditions reported by Boss et al. (2015). Unfortunately, Posey et al.’s
(2015) data did not permit them to report their full PMT nomological model, so it is difficult to conclude
definitively how our full model is similar to or different from their reported results.
Table 3 summarizes the path coefficients and SMC (R2) for our study, the Warkentin et al. (2016) PLS-SEM
results and the Siponen et al. (2014) model. As shown in Table 3, Warkentin et al.’s (2016) and Siponen et
al.’s (2014) core PMT models yielded very different results from our study. They both found a significant
positive relationship for perceived threat vulnerability and severity, whereas we found no statistically
significant relationship in our core PMT model. Warkentin et al. (2016) found that both threat appraisal
constructs and self-efficacy were strong and significant direct contributors that explained 82% of the
variance of continued protective behavior intention. Siponen et al. (2014) also reported significant paths for
the threat appraisal constructs and self-efficacy similar to Warkentin et al. (2016) but their SMC was much
lower (51%). It is important to note that Siponen et al.’s (2014) model included the core PMT plus three
additional constructs, which likely contributed to a larger SMC (relative to our core model) and could have
impacted (positively or negatively) the coefficient sizes (and significance levels) for their reported core PMT
constructs.
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Table 2. SEM Model Analysis Results
Boss
Study 1
Low Fear

Boss
Study 2
High Fear

Boss
Study 2
Low Fear

Poseyb

1.649

Boss
Study 1
High Fear
2.02

2.017

2.702

2.911

1.794

413.831

898.45

893.32

5729.01

6175.93

787.688

80

251

444

443

2120

2121

439

0.984

0.96

0.941

0.954

0.94

0.949

0.929

0.0442
0.359

0.046a
0.881

0.035a
0.419

0.062a
0.777

0.062a
0.672

0.046c
0.351

0.377***

0.406**

0.086 NS

0.320***

0.174*

0.290***

0.309***

0.507***

0.185*

0.555***

0.638***

Note d

0.321***

0.211***

0.178 NS

0.467***

(-0.353)***

0.086 NS

(-0.022)NS

0.313***

0.015 NS

0.194*

0.084 NS

0.062 NS

(-0.08)NS

0.170***
Not
Tested

(-0.213)***
Not
Tested

0.286*

0.028 NS

(-0.274)***

(-0.126)*

Not tested
(-0.128)
NSe

SEM Model
Fit Statistics

Our Core
PMT

Our Full
PMT

χ2 / df

1.552

χ2

124.156

df
CFI
SRMR
PMI SMC
SEM Path
Analyses

0.0374
0.208

TSEV→ Fear
PVUL→ Fear
Fear → PMI
TSEV→ PMI
PVUL→ PMI

0.109 NS
(-0.05)NS

MAL → PMI
REFF→ PMI
SEFF→ PMI

(-0.100)NS
0.147
(p=.095)
0.312***

0.228**
0.058 NS

0.170*

0.060 NS

0.237***

0.310***

0.236***

0.09*

0.090 NS

0.291***

(-0.202)***

Note f

(-0.294)***

(-0.491)***

(-0.387)***

(-0.090)***

(-0.190)*

COST→ PMI
(-0.273)*
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, NS: Not Significant

Legend: CFI = Comparative Fit Index, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual, PMI = Protection Motivation
Intention, SMC = Squared Multiple Correlation, TSEV = Perceived Threat Severity, PVUL = Perceived Threat
Vulnerability, MAL = Maladaptive Rewards, REFF = Response Efficacy, SEFF = Self Efficacy, COST = Response
Costs, Boss = Boss et al. (2015), Posey = Posey et al. (2015)
Notes:
a: Their reported RMSEA is a comparable badness-of-fit test; RMSEA < 0.08 is considered satisfactory.
b: Posey et al. (2015) included SETA frequency and organizational commitment, which are not included in the
full PMT nomology.
c: Reported RMSEA a comparable badness-of-fit test; RMSEA < 0.08 is considered satisfactory.
d: Posey et al. (2015) dropped this path because it was highly correlated with the perceived threat severity path.
e: The Posey et al. (2015) operationalization of maladaptive rewards is very different from the Boss et al. (2015)
study and our study; our items for this construct were taken from Boss et al. (2015). Therefore, these coefficients
cannot be directly compared.
f: Posey et al. (2015) dropped this path because it was highly correlated with the response efficacy path.
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Table 3. Core PMT SEM Model Analysis Results

Measurement

Our Core PMT

Warkentin et al.
(2016)b

Siponen et al.
(2014)

Protection Motivation Intention (PMI)
Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC) or R2

0.208

0.82

0.51a

Perceived Threat Severity → PMI

0.109 NS

0.414*

0.069*

Perceived Threat Vulnerability → PMI

(-0.05)NS

0.172**

0.062*

Response Efficacy → PMI

0.147 (p=.095)

0.039 NS

0.013 NS

Self-Efficacy → PMI

0.312***

0.285**

0.087**

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, NS: Not Significant
Notes:
a: Siponen et al. (2014)'s model included the core PMT and three additional constructs,
including two strongly-significant contributors that likely had a sizable impact on SMC
and the strength of construct coefficients. The results as shown do allow an examination
of the path significance compared to the present and Warkentin et al. (2106) study.
b: The Warkentin et al. (2016) study used PLS-SEM and not CBSEM.

In our full PMT model, the most significant contributor to the participants’ protection motivations was fear.
Our respondents reported a mild sense of fear about the password threat (mean = 4.71, standard deviation
= 1.22), which provides empirical support to the Ruiter et al. (2014) finding that protection motivation can be
activated by employing even small amounts of fear in a fear appeal. None of the threat appraisal constructs
(perceived threat severity, vulnerability, maladaptive rewards) in our full PMT nomology showed strong,
significant effects on protection motivation intentions, which is consistent with our results from the core PMT
model. However, the findings for the coping appraisal constructs is quite different between our core and full
PMT models. Whereas in our core PMT model self-efficacy had a strong positive effect and response
efficacy did not, these results were flipped in the full PMT model. In the full PMT model, the effect of selfefficacy was suppressed by the inclusion of the two negative-valence constructs (response costs and fear).
Additionally, while self-efficacy diminished in explaining intentions, respondent’s belief in the efficacy of
password managers emerged as the strongest of the positive-valence coping mechanisms.
Although neither perceived threat severity nor vulnerability were significant direct contributors to protection
motivations, the full PMT nomology posits that these two variables are at least partially mediated by fear.
In order to test for mediation in the full PMT model, we used the bootstrapping method described in Hayes
(2009) and illustrated in Vance, Lowry, and Eggett (2015). Table 4 shows the results of the bootstrapping
analysis using 5000 resamples. These results indicate that fear does partially mediate the impact of both
perceived threat severity and vulnerability on protection motivation intentions.
Table 4. Bootstrapped CI Tests for Full and Partial Mediation in the Full PMT Model
Mediation Test (ab)

Variable
Perceived Threat
Severity
Perceived Threat
Vulnerability
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Full/Partial Mediation Test (c')

2.5%
lower
bound

97.5%
upper
bound

Zero
included?

2.5%
lower
bound

97.5%
upper
bound

Zero
included?

Type of
Mediation

0.106

0.368

No

-0.177

0.126

Yes

Partial

0.062

0.3

No

-0.253

0.054

Yes

Partial
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Part 2: Actual Behaviors and Inhibiting and Enabling Factors

The evaluation of the structural model in part 1 of the study helped clarify the relationships between the
behavioral antecedents of the core and full PMT nomology based on self-reported behavioral intentions
from the sample population. Part 2 of our study provided a measure of how many participants actually
followed-through and used a password manager, which is consistent with Boss et al.’s (2015) measure of
actual usage. However, from our reading of Boss et al. (2015) it is unclear how they estimated beta
coefficients from the intention construct to the actual use construct given their small sample sizes,
particularly in their high fear appeal groups. Our sample size of 283 coupled with the binary outcome
variable that we used for actual use made using CBSEM problematic for this path. As such, we analyzed
these data more descriptively.
Of the 283 participants in our study, 38 (13.4%) installed and used the recommended password manager
(LastPass). The almost unanimous reason given for deciding to install and use the password manager was
because the tool is effective at improving poor password management practices. Participants in Part 2 of
the study were also asked about their intentions to use password managers in the future. A comparison of
the behavioral intentions scores for Part 1 (mean = 5.43, n = 38, standard deviation = 1.32) and Part 2
(mean = 5.40, n = 38, standard deviation = 1.58) for this group show no statistical differences (t = 0.181, df
= 37, p = 0.858). However, it is notable that the Part 1 behavioral intentions scores for those that did not
install a password manager (mean = 4.05, n = 245, standard deviation = 1.43) is significantly lower than
those that did (mean = 5.43, n = 38, standard deviation = 1.32).
We then analyzed the behavioral intentions scores for the group of participants that chose not to use a
password manager provides. The Part 1 behavioral intentions scores (mean = 4.05, n = 245, standard
deviation = 1.43) showed effectively neutral intentions to install and use a password manager, which played
out in only a small percentage of participants actually performing the recommended security behavior.
However, comparing the results of the Part 1 behavioral intentions scores with the Part 2 scores (mean =
4.66, n = 245, standard deviation = 1.48) showed a statistically significant increase in the same population’s
intention to use a password manager in the future (t = -7.02, df = 244, p < 0.001), which may potentially
result in additional protective behavior adoption in the future.

5

Discussion and Conclusion

Although the PMT started out as a single theory when it was first formulated (Rogers, 1975, 1983),
behavioral information security researchers have applied different variations of the PMT to explain a variety
of behavioral information security problems (Aurigemma, 2013; Crossler & Belanger, 2014; Herath & Rao,
2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lee, Larose, & Rifon, 2008; Liang & Xue, 2010). While the core PMT
model is still frequently used, the full PMT model presented by Boss et al. (2015) and Posey et al. (2015)
offers an extended, arguably more theoretically comprehensive nomological net with the incorporation of
response costs, fear, and maladaptive rewards. 4 In our study, we applied the core and full PMT nomologies
to the longstanding security problem of poor password management in order to uncover factors that
influence home end-user intentions and actual adoption of a password manager application.
Even though the difference in variance explained between our core and full PMT models may suggest that
future research should always build off the full PMT nomology, we do not make that recommendation. Which
version of the PMT is theoretically justified depends partially on the research objective. For example, one
goal of the Boss et al. (2015) paper was to explore the research opportunities and gains afforded by
measuring the impact of different fear-appeal manipulations on users’ behaviors. In this case, the
manipulation and measurement of fear is a centerpiece of the research goal and justifies, if not requires,
the use of the full PMT. In comparison, the goal of the Siponen et al. (2014) paper was to present and test
a multi-theory model of employee Information Security Policy (ISP) compliance across a range of security
threats and actions included in the respondents’ security policies. In the case of Siponen et al. (2014), they
captured cross-sectional behavioral data from four real organizations to test their integrated model. Siponen
et al. (2014) did not directly manipulate or capture fear in their study. Instead, they relied upon the
4

While the importance of the fear appeal in the PMT-related literature is widely accepted, there is some research that questions the
importance of fear (one of the components of a fear appeal) as a behavioral motivator. Warkentin, Johnston, Walden, and Straub
(2016) recently conducted a study that examined the impact of fear appeals on participants using fMRI data. They found that while
fear appeals activated threat and threat response assessments, they found no evidence of an actual fear response. This finding is in
contrast with Boss et al. (2015), Posey et al. (2016), and our study (albeit using significantly different research methods).
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documented activities of the employees’ organizations security awareness and training education programs
to provide organization-specific fear appeals. Although Siponen et al. (2014) did not directly manipulate or
measure fear in their study, they were still able to incorporate and evaluate the core PMT constructs in their
integrated model based upon the specific goals of their research, which were different from the goals of
Boss et al.’s (2015) paper. Therefore, it would be ill-advised to claim that Siponen et al.’s (2014) PMT model
is an inferior model simply because they did not use the nomology proposed by Boss et al. (2015) and
Posey et al. (2015).
In our study, both the core and full PMT models performed rather poorly in explaining the variance in
participant protection motivation intentions relative to the previously published research. One possible
reason for this disparity is that the security threats and actions were significantly different in our study from
the comparison studies. In the Warkentin et al. (2016) study, for instance, participant data was captured
over time for initial installation and continued use of a simulated anti-malware program. In their study,
participants voluntarily installed a security program that reminded them to use the software at least weekly.
The level of effort required by the participants was highest in the beginning of their study when voluntarily
visiting the software download page and installing the software. Continued use of the software required the
students to approve the “scanning” of their computer with the software when prompted. The malware threat
and associated security actions in their study are very different from those experienced by participants in
our study. Our study directly recommended but did not provide a prompt to actually install and use a
password manager.
Furthermore, home-end users may be more aware of a threat of a virus relative to the threat associated
with reusing a password or employing a relatively weak password (Huth, Orlando, & Pesante, 2013; Zeltser,
2015). Additionally, we suggest that using a password manager is a sufficiently different security action
from anti-malware applications in the sense that there is a potentially steep initial learning curve and a fairly
high setup cost associated with adopting password managers before the applications become easy to use
and useful. This threat context is quite different from the anti-malware (Boss et al., 2015, Warkentin et al.,
2016) and data backup contexts (Boss et al., 2015), because there typically is not a high learning curve or
an initially high set up cost associated with installing and using those types of applications over time.
The Boss et al.’s (2015) variance explained in both of their fear appeal groups across their two studies was
significantly higher than the reported variance explained in our full PMT nomology. One possible
explanation for this difference is that the Boss et al. (2015) studies involved repeated measures with
repeated security fear appeal messages being presented to participants during use of their computing
devices. In the context of anti-malware and data backups, the repeated fear appeal message approach is
reasonable. Our study, however, is more reflective of a health-related public service advisory (PSA) type
of fear appeal where our threat message does not occur on a regularly recurring basis. Our message
introduces the fear appeal to participants, which for many of our participants may have been their first
exposure to the threat and the coping mechanism. Additionally, our fear appeal was relatively short and
non-recurring which, coupled with our different security related action, may explain the difference in variance
explained and path coefficient differences from the comparison studies.
Interestingly, Boss et al. (2015) manipulated fear appeals in their quasi-experimental study whereas Posey
et al. (2015) and our study did not manipulate fear appeals. This controlled manipulation allowed Boss et
al. (2015) to test the impact of the PMT constructs using different fear appeals, which they categorized as
high and low. However, the Boss et al. (2015) study did not have a control group in their quasi-experiment
so it is difficult to determine how their low and high fear appeal groups differed from a control group. Both
groups in their two studies were manipulated. Nevertheless, different constructs may become more
important or less important depending on the threat message or the coping response contained in different
fear appeals. Therefore, it is possible that the differences in the full PMT nomology reported by Posey et
al. (2015) and our paper may be attributable to characteristics of the fear appeal in addition to (or instead
of) the differences in the security action that was investigated.
Irrespective of our explanation for why our results vary from the results reported for other studies using the
core and full PMT models, our different results do suggest that researchers should be cautious about
universally applying either instantiation of the PMT to all behavioral information security threats and actions.
It may very well be that both the core and full PMT models are more capable of explaining the variance with
the types of security behaviors examined in the Warkentin et al. (2016) and Boss et al. (2015) papers and
less capable for security actions like using password managers. Password managers are not as familiar to
users, have higher initial setup costs, and/or do not provide repeated fear appeal messages and prompts.
Given these differences, our results suggest further replication of these models is needed using different
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types of security actions, different types of research designs, and different types of fear appeals. It is not
possible to conclude that our theoretical replication study is better or worse than the previously published
papers because each has its own strengths and weaknesses. However, the different path coefficients and
variance explained does suggest that there is a scientific need to further replicate both the core and full
PMT nomologies.
There are several limitations with our replication study. Our study only considered a pre-set time interval
between the two surveys, which may have not been enough time for some of our research participants to
act on the fear appeal. An interesting future study may investigate greater time spacing between when
intentions are measured and when actual behaviors are determined. Ideally, a longer longitudinal study
with more realistic organizational manipulations would be useful in measuring behavioral intentions, actual
adoptions, and continued usage over a much longer time period would help reveal further insights into the
core and full PMT models. Additionally, our study examines the performance of both PMT models (core
and full) using a single fear appeal message. Therefore, our reported differences between Boss et al. (2015)
may be a function of the fear appeal. Future research may offer an empirical replication of the Boss et al.
(2015) instead of our theoretical replication. Those two studies can then be interpreted in tandem to further
contextualize our reported results. Finally, we measured maladaptive rewards using the construct definition
and items from Boss et al. (2015), which are very different from the conceptualization and construct
measurement items from Posey et al. (2015). Posey et al.’s (2015) operationalization of maladaptive
rewards measures intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, which may modify the relative size and magnitude of the
effect of maladaptive rewards on protection motivation. Future assessments should seek to gain more
comprehensive understanding of maladaptive rewards for use in PMT-related studies.
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Appendix A. Construct Definitions and Measurement Items

Construct
Protection
Motivation
Intention

Fear

Self-efficacy

Maladaptive
Rewards

Response
Costs

Definition from Boss et al.
(2015)
Self-reported intention to perform
the security behavior.

A negatively valenced emotion
representing a response that
arises from recognizing danger.
This response may include any
combination of apprehension,
fright, arousal, concern, worry,
discomfort, or a general negative
mood, and it manifests itself
emotionally, cognitively, and
physically (Leventhal, 1970;
McIntosh, Zajonc, Vig, &
Emerick, 1997; Osman, Barrios,
Osman, Schneekloth, &
Troutman, 1994; Witte, 1992,
1996, 1998)
“The perceived ability of the
person to actually carry out the
adaptive [coping] response”
(Floyd et al., 2000, p. 411;
Maddux & Rogers, 1983)
The general rewards (intrinsic
and extrinsic) of not protecting
oneself, contrary to the fear
appeal (Floyd et al., 2000;
Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997)

“Any costs (e.g., monetary,
personal, time, effort) associated
with taking the adaptive coping
response” (Floyd et al., 2000, p.
411)

Volume 5

Survey Question/Measurement
Item
I intend to use a password manager
in the next week.
I predict I will use a password
manager in the next week.
I plan to use a password manager in
the next week.
I am worried about the prospect of
having my online account
passwords stolen and abused by
cybercriminals.
I am frightened about the prospect
of having my online account
passwords stolen and abused by
cybercriminals.
I am anxious about the prospect of
having my online account
passwords stolen and abused by
cybercriminals.

Item
BINT1

Factor
Load
0.95

Mean
4.24

Std
Dev
1.52

BINT2

0.98

4.23

1.54

BINT3

0.93

4.25

1.57

FEAR1

0.78

4.95

1.31

FEAR2

0.85

4.82

1.37

FEAR3

0.79

4.42

1.48

Password manager software is easy
to use.
Password manager software is
convenient to use.
I am able to use password software
without much effort.
Using a password manager would
slow down the speed of my access
to the Internet.
Using a password manager would
slow down my computer.

SE1

0.82

5.27

1.11

SE2

0.83

5.15

1.18

SE3

0.81

5.14

1.17

MAL1

0.67

3.52

1.51

MAL2

0.88

3.01

1.35

Using a password manager would
interfere with other programs on my
computer.
Using a password manager would
limit the functionality of computer.

MAL3

0.93

3.05

1.38

MAL4

0.88

2.94

1.31

There is too much work associated
with trying to increase the security of
my online account. passwords
through the use of a password
manager application
Using a password manager
application on my computer would
require considerable investment of
effort other than time.
Using a password manager
application would be time
consuming.

COST1

0.84

5.77

1.01

COST2

0.88

5.75

0.97

COST3

0.76

5.73

1.11
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Perceived
Threat
Vulnerability

Perceived
Threat
Severity

Response
Efficacy
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Definition from Boss et al. (2015)
“How personally susceptible an
individual feels to the
communicated threat” (Milne,
Sheeran, & Orebell, 2000, p. 108)

“How serious the individual
believes that the threat would be”
to him- or herself (Milne et al.,
2000, p. 108)

“The belief that the adaptive
[coping] response will work, that
taking the protective action will be
effective in protecting the self or
others” (Floyd et al., 2000, p. 411;
Maddux & Rogers, 1983)
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Survey Question/Measurement
Item
My online account passwords are
at risk of being stolen and abused
by cyber-criminals
It is likely that my online account
passwords will be stolen and
abused by cyber-criminals.
It is possible that my online
account passwords will be stolen
and abused by cyber-criminals.
If my online account passwords
were stolen and abused by cybercriminals, it would be severe.
If my online account passwords
were stolen and abused by cybercriminals, it would be serious.
If my online account passwords
were stolen and abused by cybercriminals, it would be significant.
Password manager applications
work to protect my online account
passwords from being stolen and
abused by cyber-criminals.
Password manager applications
are an effective solution to protect
my online account passwords
from being stolen and abused by
cyber-criminals.
When using a password manager
application, online passwords are
more likely to be protected from
being stolen and abused by
cyber-criminals.

Item
PVUL1

Factor
Load
0.85

Mean
4.93

Std
Dev
1.33

PVUL2

0.70

4.10

1.36

PVUL3

0.69

5.17

1.36

TSEV1

0.71

5.81

1.18

TSEV2

0.92

6.07

1.02

TSEV3

0.76

5.94

1.20

REFF1

0.82

5.77

1.01

REFF2

0.71

5.75

0.97

REFF3

0.80

5.73

1.11
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Appendix B. Video Script
Welcome to this video on password manager applications, why you should use one, and how to get started
quickly and for free. Following is a short, 2-minute animation that does a great job at discussing the
problems we all face with passwords and what we can do about it.
[The following script is from the EFF’s video about using password managers found at
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/animated-overview-using-password-managers-stay-safe-online]
You get a lot done on the internet that means you probably have a lot of accounts with tons of websites
right? But do you use the same password on all of them? Or do you almost use the same password and
change it a little bit for each site? Well, that’s a problem.
If you use the same password on every website and just one of these websites gets broken into by
cybercriminals and there is always one site you use that is not secure then those thieves could get the
passwords of everyone on that site. Then they can use them to break into all those other accounts.
These kinds of break-ins happen far more often than you think. Sometimes they even happen without the
hacked website knowing. So don’t reuse your passwords!
But wait! If you have lots of website accounts and each of them now needs a unique password how can you
possibly remember them all? Aren’t we supposed to keep our passwords in our heads and never write them
down? Writing them down is actually not that bad of an idea. If you use lots of passwords write them down
and keep them somewhere safe like your wallet then you will at least know if your passwords go missing or
get stolen, that’s more than you might know if you use just one password everywhere and then a website
you use is silently hacked and even a safer plan though is to use a password manager.
Password Managers are programs you can download for your phone or computer, it will create, store and
even automatically fill in unique passwords on websites and other online services. It can keep all of your
account details safe and synchronize them between all of your devices. So, you never have to remember
all those passwords again. You can search for password managers reviews so you can find out what the
most secure net users out there prefer. Use password managers to resist the temptation to use one
password on all your sites. Remember it’s a trap.
There is one catch with password managers though, password managers do need a password for
themselves. One that you use to type into the password manager to access all of your other passwords.
You will want that password to be extra secure but easy to remember because it is the one password you
won’t be able to store in your password manager. But that one password will keep you a lot safer in a
sometimes dangerous net. [End EFF video script]
That’s an interesting video… but maybe it doesn’t apply to you? Perhaps you don’t have many passwords
to worry about. Let’s think about it – what are some of your accounts that need passwords? Maybe you
have some social media accounts? Did you find a great idea on Pinterest about taking Vine videos of the
latest Starbucks drink, then taking a picture of the cup and posting it on Snapchat, Tumblr, Facebook and
Twitter while simultaneously telling their 5 different friend groups on GroupMe, Kik, and WhatsAp to please
like their Instagram photo of this once-in-a-lifetime event.
Maybe you do some online shopping? Holiday shopping on Amazon or Etsy, Target, ebay, or maybe
Walmart for the cheap stuff. And don’t forget you have to pay for all of those purchases by putting in your
credit card.
And when you are hard at work, you might need a break with some of your many online entertainment
options (feel like binge watching Game of Thrones, anyone?). And don’t forget your multiple home and
work email accounts that you have to constantly check all day long.
Come to think of it… when you start counting all the applications that you use that require passwords,
knowing that each one is supposed to have a strong unique password you probably have A LOT more
passwords to deal with than originally thought.
So, OK, maybe there is a password management problem we all have to deal with. But are password
managers a safe solution? The answer is generally yes. While there will always be some level of risk
associated with locking all of your passwords up in one file, even if it is highly encrypted, the benefits of
using a password manager are considered much greater than the alternative of using, and reusing, weak
or predictable passwords.
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The US Department of Homeland Defense’s Computer Emergency Readiness Team and the internationally
recognized information security training and awareness organization, the SANS institute, both strongly
recommend the use of password managers. As well as just about every major technology, news, and
consumer advocacy group.
Fortunately, there are many password manager applications to choose from with prices starting as low as
FREE. For example, three popular password managers are LastPass, 1Password, and Dashlane.
All good password managers provide similar functionality, such as:
 Importing existing passwords from your web browsers. Many of us use more than one web
browser sometimes on different computers, which can be very unsafe.
 Password managers also not only help you easily create strong and unique passwords for each
site, but automatically capture login credentials when logging into a site for the first time.
 Another important feature in a good password manager is the ability to check the security level of
all of your current passwords. For example, LastPass and 1Password both allow you to check all
your passwords to identify all the weak, old, reused and yes, even known COMPROMISED
accounts.
For example, if you had a LinkedIn, Yahoo, or Snapchat account any time in the past several years, there
is a real possibility that hackers stole your account credentials. Having a password manager that keeps
track of major account hacks, so that you don’t have to, is a great benefit.
Password managers sound useful, so what’s the next step? First, you are strongly recommended to start
using a password manager as soon as possible. We recommend LastPass because it is well established
and offers great password management functionality and its FREE. Just got to www.lastpass.com to
download a version for your Mac, PC, or even Linux. After you install the desktop version of LastPass, you
should be prompted to import your current web browser account passwords. You should definitely do this
because it not only automatically populates some of your passwords, but makes you safer by getting rid of
these passwords in the much-less-secure browser password storage. After you have LastPass populated
with some passwords, run the Security Challenge; this will test the strength of your Master Password and
all your individual passwords. The security challenge will identify all your compromised, weak, reused or
old passwords and then even help you with the process of changing them to strong, secure passwords.
In summary, we all have many account passwords that we need to protect. The simple truth is that it’s too
hard for most of us to create and remember a lot of passwords, even bad passwords. All of our passwords
should be strong and unique, which makes memorizing our passwords even harder! Strong passwords
should be 12 characters or longer with mixed letters, numbers, and special characters.
Password managers allow us to create and remember one strong, unique password, our Master Password,
which unlocks all our other account passwords. Security experts recommend using password managers
because they are safe and effective. Whether you use a free password manager like LastPass or a paid
version like 1Password, the investment is well worth it!
[Note: the video for this script is posted at https://youtu.be/ru3JXo7YoVc]
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